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Abstract
This paper explores municipal decision making in condemnation proceedings and
whether or not the public use requirement protects individual property owners from poor
municipal decision-making. When condemners are allowed to take in fee simple absolute, their
decisions have lasting effects on property. The decisions of the Baltimore City government in its
creation of a water system illustrate why some may be queasy about this. However, this may
actually be desirable because it allows for municipalities, in particular, to both achieve the
public purpose necessary at the time of condemnation and to improve in the future rather than
go through the hassle of returning land a century later.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lake Roland Park, a bucolic green space surrounding Lake Roland, sits just north of
Baltimore City in the midst of suburban housing developments and roads. 1 The wealthy
Buchanan family once owned the space until Baltimore City condemned it for a reservoir in
1857 2. The reservoir remained operational until 1915 when the City transformed its water
system for public health reasons. 3 The City repurposed the reservoir and surrounding land as a
recreation area. 4 In 1965, more than one hundred years after the condemnation, C. A. Buchanan
Shreve and other heirs of the Buchanan estate, brought a suit in ejectment against the Mayor and
1

"Lake Roland - Baltimore County." Lake Roland. Baltimore County Md., 21 Oct. 2015. Web.
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See infra, Part III.D.
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See infra, Part III.D.
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City Council of Baltimore requesting return of the property and one and half million dollars in
damages. 5 The heirs claimed that the Enabling Act under with the City had condemned the
Buchanan land only allowed the City to take what was necessary for its water system. 6 So, if the
City ceased to use property taken under the Enabling Act as part of the water system, it would
revert to the original owner or his successor in interest. 7 The Maryland Court of Appeals threw
the suit out on summary judgment. 8 This paper explores both the historical and legal aspects of
this eminent domain dispute.
First, this paper will embark on an historical overview of how the Buchanan property
came to be condemned 9 and why it eventually became a park. 10 Both these choices were largely
the product of contemporary politics. 11 Buchanan’s land was condemned as a result of the City’s
1854 decision to expand the Jones Falls rather than utilizing the more voluminous Gunpowder
Falls. 12 Historians attribute this decision to contemporary fiscal conservatism. 13 The early
Twentieth Century decision to cease using the Jones Falls as a water source and convert the
reservoir area to a park was equally rooted in contemporary movements – Progressivism and the
City Beautiful Movement. 14 The use as a reservoir was discontinued as a matter of public health
necessity. 15 This decision was in line with other progressive improvements at the time. 16 The
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choice to convert the land to a park was in line with the City Beautiful movement, which
emphasized green space. 17
Second, the paper will explore the correctness of the decision in Shreve’s case in light of
the history. 18 The arguments presented in briefs represent two fundamental tensions. 19 First,
when confronted with statutory interpretation how far from the four corners of the document
should the court go? 20 Second, how much protection from the state eminent domain power
should the property owners be afforded? 21 Or, conversely, how much discretion should a
municipality have? 22
II. AN ACT FOR SUPPLYING BALTIMORE CITY WITH DRINKING WATER
A. Baltimore City and its water system at the turn of 1850’s
In the late 1840’s and early 1850’s, Baltimore was booming. 23 The construction of the B
& O Railroad brought wealth and opportunity to the City. 24 The population swelled

25

as waves

of immigrants fleeing agricultural crisis in Europe chose to settle there. 26 From 1840 to 1850, the
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population grew from 102,313 to 169,054 – a sixty-nine increase in just a decade. 27 This growth
taxed the city’s public works, especially the underdeveloped water and sewage systems. 28
At the turn of the 1850’s, Baltimore’s water system was privately owned and wholly
inadequate. 29 One company exercised monopoly power over the system. 30 As a result, only half
the city had water main service and only a quarter of residents purchased their water from the
company. 31 Poorer residents were unable to afford the service. 32 While the wealthy had water
pumped into their townhomes via pipes, poorer residents had to walk blocks to retrieve water
from shallow polluted wells around the city. 33 The pollution was attributable to two things.34
First, Wealthy residents, contrary to the law, would drain their privies into the Jones Falls.35
Second, the sewer system in place was defective. 36 Human waste in the water supply led to the
spread of disease especially during the summer months. 37 Each year many died from intestinal
diseases such as cholera. 38 Realizing that the city government would soon take over the water
business, the water company began improving and expanding service. 39 It constructed a reservoir
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where the Belvedere Hotel presently stands and bought properties along the Jones Falls to protect
its property rights from the municipality. 40 However, it was not enough. 41
In 1852, John Smith Hollins took office as mayor. 42 During his tenure as mayor, Hollins
took on a many public projects to address the growing city’s needs. 43 New schools and markets
were constructed. 44 The development of a sewer system got underway. 45 Most significantly, he
laid the groundwork for the conveying pure, clean water to the City. 46 Under Hollins, the City
took over the water system from the private company and obtained condemnation powers from
the Maryland General Assembly to expand the water system. 47
B. The Maryland State Legislature Authorizes Eminent Domain to Bring Clean Water to the
Growing City.
In 1853, Baltimore City, as a municipal corporation created by the General Assembly, did
not have general eminent domain powers. 48 Each time the City wanted to embark on a new civic
project, City officials had to request the power of condemnation from the Maryland General
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Assembly. 49 In 1853, the Maryland General Assembly granted the City the power to condemn
lands for the purpose of “conveying water” for fire protection, security and health. 50
The first section purported to empower the City to purchase a variety of interests in land
and water for the completion of its project. 51 In relevant part, this section gives the City the
following powers:
Contract for, purchase, lease and hold to them and their successors, in fee simple, or for a
term of years any land, real estate, brook, water and water course, and also the right to
use and occupy forever or for a term of years, any land, real estate, brook, water and
water course which they my conceive expedient and necessary for the purpose of
conveying water into the said city. 52
To parse this language a little, it appears that the city could purchase any number of estates in the
property it sought to acquire. The words “to them and their successors, in fee simple” seem to
imply a fee simple absolute estate. The words “for a term of years” seem to connote a lesser
interest. 53 Finally, “[T]he right to use and occupy” seems to connote a right of way. 54 The
discretion the General Assembly afforded the City is likely attributable to the varied property
interests the City would need to acquire in completing a water system. 55 A reservoir, for
example, would entail a greater interest, maybe even fee simple absolute, because the City would
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need to flood the property to create it. 56 However, for laying pipes to transport water from the
reservoir to homes and businesses, the City would only need to acquire an easement. 57
The second section detailed the procedure for condemning the property if the City and the
property owner could not agree. 58 First, the City would issue a warrant to the sheriff of the
county in which the property was located commanding him to summon a jury of twenty
uninterested freeholders to value the property. 59 The Mayor and City Council were also to give
twenty days notice to the property owner. 60 On the specified day, the jury would convene on the
property. 61 The City and the landowner would each strike four jurors leaving twelve jurors to
assess the amount necessary for the City to “purchase and hold or use” the property. 62 The jurors
would then swear to “justly and impartially value the damages which the owner would sustain by
the use and occupation” by the City. 63 Next the jurors would return the value of the land and the
quality of title the city was to have. 64 Once the jurors performed their inquisition and reduced it
to writing, a court could then either confirm or deny the condemnation. 65
The third section gave the Mayor and City Council the ability to defray its costs by
issuing certificates of debt “to be denominated on the face ‘Baltimore Water Stock’” in lieu of
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cash purchases. 66 These certificates would accrue interest of six cents per year. 67 The fourth
section gave the city power to purchase property of other companies conveying water to the city
– thus disbanding the private water works. 68
The fifth and final section forbade the City to build a dam at Raven’s Rocks that would
submerge land more than eighty feet “from the present banks of the Gun Powder River”. 69 While
the Gunpowder would eventually become the City’s water source, the Jones Falls was the first
source tapped under this act. 70 Based on this section, it seems that the original intent of the City,
under Mayor Hollins, was to utilize the Gunpowder River. 71 However, Hollins left office before
getting to shape the course of the water system. 72
C. The City Chooses the Jones Falls
Once the City acquired the private water company in 1853 for one million three hundred
and fifty dollars, it remained to be seen how the City would develop the water system. 73 The City
had two options: the Gunpowder Falls or the Jones Falls. 74 The Jones Falls flows from
northwestern Baltimore County through Baltimore City and out into the Patapsco River. 75 The
Gunpowder Falls flows from farther north of the City and east of the City into the Chesapeake

66

1853 Md. Laws 545, § 3.
Id.
68
1853 Md. Laws 545, § 4.
69
1853 Md. Laws 545, § 5.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See infra, Part II.C.
73
OLSEN, supra note 24, at 136.
74
Id. at 137.
75
See Appendix A.
67

8

Bay. 76 The private water company had already begun developing the Jones Falls making it the
cheaper option. 77 Additionally, developing the Gunpowder Falls would require more complex
and costly engineering feats, as it does not flow through the City. 78 However, the Gunpowder
Falls was a better water source due to its “volume and cleanliness.” 79 Virtually all engineering
experts consulted were of the opinion that the Gunpowder, despite greater construction costs,
would be a superior water source. 80
When the time came to choose between the Jones Falls and Gunpowder Falls, the City
leadership and economic conditions had changed. 81 After 1852, the completion of railroad
projects led to unemployment and a downward economic turn. 82 This economic climate along
with the recent Irish Catholic immigration and the impending abolition of slavery brought about
the rise of Know-Nothing or American party. 83 The American Party was both anti-immigrant and
pro-slavery. 84 Nationally, their main priorities were electing “native” American politicians and
placing a twenty-five year residency requirement on citizenship. 85 In Maryland, they were
associated with the temperance movement. 86
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American Party Mayor, Samuel Hinks, took office in 1854. 87 Another American Party
mayor, Thomas Swann, succeeded him in 1856. 88 Both Hinks and Swann believed that taking
the cheaper route of expanding the Jones Falls water system to sources beyond the city limits
would best serve the City. 89 In reference to the decision to develop the Jones Falls over the
Gunpowder Falls, Mayor Hicks explained that the greater volume of the Gunpowder Falls need
not be a factor because the population would not grow to “six-hundred thousand souls” until well
after the “the youngest male child of the present day would be an old man.” 90 Hinks, himself,
attributed this to a desire to not incur debt for the city. 91 This seemed like a reasonable
assessment given that economic growth had halted when the B&O Railroad project had ended. 92
However, it did not account for the influxes of European Catholic immigrants, which continued
to increase Baltimore’s population. 93 It also did not account for the engineers’ assessment that
the Gunpowder would provide cleaner water. 94 Given the extent to which the Jones Falls was
polluted, this was more than a mere oversight. 95 This rash decision-making would later prove to
be the impetus of a public health crisis. 96
D. The Buchanan property is condemned and transformed into Swann Lake
87
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A major part of the Jones Falls project was the construction of a dam on the Jones Falls
north of the city limits. 97 Mr. Charles A. Buchanan owned the site. 98 The City and Mr. Buchanan
were unable to agree upon the value of the land. 99 An inquisition followed as per section two of
the Enabling Act. 100 The Water Board President, Mr. Columbus O’Donnell, sent a letter to the
Baltimore County Justice of the Peace, Mr. George W. Ritter, asking him to assembly a jury for
the inquisition. 101 Mr. Ritter, in turn, issued a warrant to the County Sherriff, Mr. William Pole
Esq., requesting him to assemble a jury on the 10th of September. 102 Mr. O’Donnell also notified
Mr. Buchanan of the inquisition.103
The inquisition concluded on October 6th, 1857. 104 The jury assessed the property at
thirteen thousand dollars. 105 Mr. Pole had instructed the jury to assess both the damages to Mr.
Buchanan for the city’s use and occupation of his land as well as the “fee simple estate
therein.” 106 The jury, in returning its verdict, used the same language stating that is was not only
assessing damages from condemnation, but also the “fee simple thereof”. 107 The jury left to Mr.
Buchanan and his heirs a private road leading to a rail station on his property 108. The Circuit

97

Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 6.
See, Appendix B.
99
Joint Record Extract, Shreve v. Baltimore, 243 Md. 613, E 15 (1966) (No. 370) (Hereinafter
Joint Record Extract).
100
Compare id. at E. 15 – 22 with 1854 Md. Laws 545 §2.
101
Joint Record Extract, supra note 99, at 15 – 22.
102
Id. at E. 15.
103
Id.
104
Id. at E. 17.
105
Id. at E. 21.
106
Id. at E. 17.
107
Joint Record Extract, supra note 99, at E. 18.
108
Id. at E. 21.
11
98

Court for Baltimore County confirmed the condemnation and Mr. Buchanan sent notice that the
condemnation had been satisfied. 109
A dam was constructed on the Jones Falls and a reservoir formed. 110 The city christened
the new body of water Swann Lake. 111 It would later come to be called Lake Roland. 112
E. The owners of condemned property fight back
While the city’s condemnation Mr. Buchanan’s land was only met with only resistance as
to the value, 113 other landowners challenged the validity of the takings. 114 Three such cases went
to the Maryland Court of Appeals. 115
In Graff, the Court held that after a jury valued the property as per the Enabling Act, the
City was not obligated to pay for the land. 116 A jury entered on Graff’s property at Stony Brook
Run and completed an inquisition.117 After a court confirmed the condemnation, the city decided
not to purchase Graff’s property, as it no longer fit in the plan. 118 Graff took the City to court to
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force it to pay for the condemnation. 119 The Maryland Court of Appeals explained that the entry
of the jury on Graff’s land was not a taking because it “does not devest the owner’s title.” Title
would have only devested if the city had actually tendered compensation. 120 The Court held that
the City was not obligated to purchase the land, which it did not deem necessary for conveying
water. 121 To hold otherwise, it said, would be a great burden on the citizens of Baltimore, as the
City would be forced to purchase unnecessary property with taxpayer dollars. 122
In Kane, the City had condemned land from a Mr. Tonge. 123 After the inquisition, but
before the City paid Tonge, other individuals asserted interests in the land. 124 The City
interpleaded and a court declared that it owned the property in fee simple. 125 Later, Tonge
became insolvent, and Kane 126 purchased his property at an auction. 127 Kane then filed suit to
enjoin the City from interfering with his use of the property as a mill. 128 He claimed that the City
could not stop him from operating the mill because its operation did not interfere with the City
conveying water. 129 The City contended that it had purchased a fee simple absolute estate and
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thus, could use the water flowing over the dam in any way it saw fit. 130 The Court of Appeals
agreed with Kane. 131 It explained that, under the Maryland Constitution, the General Assembly
could only grant power to condemn for a public purpose. 132 Here, the public purpose was a water
system and the City could condemn no more than was necessary to achieve that purpose. 133
Thus, they could only require Kane to stop using the mill if it interfered with the conveyance of
water. 134 It did not. 135 Kane could keep his mill. 136
In Taylor, the City sought to construct a subterranean aqueduct seventy-nine to one
hundred and twenty feet below the surface of Taylor’s property. 137 There was some evidence that
the jury had valued the Taylor property solely based on its subterranean value. 138 Taylor claimed
that the City should have to pay for the surface rights as well. 139 The Court found the language in
the Enabling Act granted the City broad discretion to condemn any interest in land up to a fee
simple. 140 The Court again explained, as it had in Kane, that “the city could only acquire under a
condemnation such use and occupation as was necessary for the purpose mentioned in the Act,
under which the condemnation was had.” 141 Thus, the jury need only assess damages for what
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the City needed – a right of way to construct a subterranean tunnel. 142 The City did not need to
pay for the surface rights. 143
These three cases purport to both protect the landowner’s property rights and the City’s
discretion. 144 The City had discretion to determine exactly what property interest was necessary
for its water project. 145 It could not be required to purchase more. 146 The City also could not get
greedy and interfere with property interests that did not inhibit its conveyance of water. 147 What
remained unclear was the durability of the interests the City acquired. 148
F. A new and improved, yet imperfect water system
When it was completed in 1862, the City’s new water system looked as follows. 149 The
dam constructed on Buchanan’s land created a lake, Lake Roland. 150 Water flowed in a five by
six conduit four miles to a reservoir in the Hampden neighborhood and to two other reservoirs –
the Mt. Royal Reservoir and the Lake Chapman Reservoir. 151 The Baltimore Sun proudly
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announced the system’s completion and stated that its thirty million gallon capacity promised to
serve Baltimore for many generations to come. 152 It also explained that the new water system
was far less expensive than those in other major cities. 153 The Baltimore system conveyed water
using only gravity whereas other cities had to utilize pumps.154 As a result, the construction had
been much cheaper. 155 In 1862, another reservoir was a planned where Druid Lake Park is
today. 156 The new system allowed for greater access to water for city residents – an exciting
innovation for many, who had previously needed to walk blocks to retrieve water from wells. 157
However, the system was not without its problems. 158
Mayor Hinks’ prediction of the city’s population growth potential proved wrong. 159 By
1870, the population had already grown to 276,354. 160 In 1874, the City decided to augment the
existing Jones Falls system and tap the Gunpowder Falls acknowledging that it would provide
the city with a “cleaner, more prolific source of water”. 161 The new project was completed in
1881 with a dam at Loch Raven. 162 From there, a conduit ran seven and a half miles to the new
Montebello Reservoir. 163 Another reservoir was added at Lake Clifton in 1888 to accommodate
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further population growth. 164 These innovations led to improved water clarity; however, they did
not rid the water of bacteria. 165 And the city’s population continued to swell. 166 Between 1870
and 1900, it grew from 276,354 to 558,485 167 in part due to annexation. 168
III. BALTIMORE’S WATER SUPPLY TRANSITIONS

AND A

PARK

IS

DEVELOPED

AT THE

OLD

RESERVOIR SITE
A. Dirt and Disease flow from Baltimore City’s Taps
At the turn of the Twentieth Century, disease, a growing population, and advances in
germ theory pushed the City to make significant leaps in sanitation.169 The City’s population
stood at a half a million and growing. 170 With respect to the water supply, city officials found
themselves back at square one. 171 The Jones Falls was an open sewer flowing into the harbor. 172
173

When it did not rain, the water supply was inadequate for the growing population. 174 When it

did rain, city residents found muddy, murky water flowing from their taps. 175 The water tasted
so poor that some residents continued to get their water from the shallow wells that had caused
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disease in the mid-19th century. 176 Not only was the tap water muddy and poor tasting, but it also
carried disease. 177 The City was not yet employing chemical sanitation, and sewage and bacteria
contaminated groundwater due to the lack of a proper sewage system. 178 Due to the continued
presence of waste in the water system, typhoid, a waterborne pathogen, ran rampant through the
City. 179 There were thirty-five typhoid deaths per one hundred thousand residents in Baltimore in
the first decade of the Twentieth Century. 180
Citizens urged for improvements to the water system. 181 The great fire of 1904 presented
the first opportunity to rebuild and introduce sanitary systems. 182 However, due to political
disagreements, private money ended up rebuilding the area; so, the City lost its opportunity to
shape the development. 183 Finally, under Mayor Mahool in 1908, the City passed a five million
dollar water loan to improve the water supply.

184

When the City began addressing the water issue this time, the municipal government’s
priorities had changed. 185 At the time, the City Beautiful movement and the progressive
movement were in full swing. 186 The Municipal Arts Society led the push for an underground
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sewage system in conjunction with more parks. 187 Meanwhile the progressive movement pushed
for “child saving” or lowering the infant mortality rate. 188 This included various measures
including improvements to the water system and milk pasteurization. 189 Both of these
movements shaped the improvements made to the water system. 190 This was no longer a city
government looking to put a mere Band-Aids on a gaping wound, but a government looking to
truly reshape the face of the City. 191
Given how long it had taken to respond to this issue, the City found itself with many
questions to answer. 192 In 1913, the city’s water engineer, Ezra B. Wittman, delivered a talk
addressing concerns and explaining the city’s progress in water sanitation and purification to the
Baltimore Women’s Civic League. 193 This talk is preserved in a pamphlet entitled Some Things
You Should Know About Your City Government. 194 Wittman first acknowledged that the water
had been muddy for some time due to agricultural run off. 195 He then explained that the problem
was particularly acute in East Baltimore, where there was no sewage system. 196 Next, he went on
to list the measures he was taking and would take to amend the issue. 197 First, in 1911, he had
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started adding calcium hydrochloride to the water supply. 198 Then, at the advice of the District of
Columbia’s water engineer, he began adding alum. 199 This combination of chemicals reduced the
amount of bacteria in the water supply dramatically. 200 As a result, typhoid cases in the City
reduced by half. 201 However, the water clarity did not improve because of mud residue left in the
pipes. 202 The City, at the advice of consultants, 203 decided to take the modernization of the water
supply further. 204 The consultants recommended constructing a higher dam and a water filtration
system. 205 The City agreed to both. 206 A higher dam would be constructed at Loch Raven and a
water filtration plant would be built at Lake Montebello both on the Gunpowder Falls. 207 At first,
there was some debate as to whether the filtration plant would use a sand or mechanical filtration
method. 208 The City preferred the sand method, but, in experiments, the sand method proved to
only remove about ten percent of the mud from the water. 209 The consultant, John R. Freeman,
took Wittman to see mechanical filtration plants. 210 Wittman noted that the water was very
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pure. 211 He also learned that mechanical filtration plants had dramatically reduced cases of
typhoid in major cities worldwide. 212 So, the city settled on a mechanical filtration plant. 213
C. The Montebello water filtration plant opens to great fanfare and success.
The Montebello Water Filtration plant opened in 1915 to great fanfare and has remained
in operation to this day. 214 The City celebrated 100 years of operation in 2015. 215 In accord with
the City Beautiful Movement, the filtration plant is not only functional, but also beautiful. 216 The
site of the plant was chosen for its aesthetic appeal and 217 the buildings have been noted for their
architectural appeal. 218 The buildings were constructed in a mixture of Beaux Arts, Spanish
Mission, and Italianate styles and the surrounding area was impeccably landscaped. 219 In
addition to being an aesthetic marvel, the plant was celebrated by local newspapers as one of the
finest filtration plants in the world. 220 It was featured in professional journals and newspapers,
and water engineers from all over the country visited it. 221 Most importantly, however, the plant
finally brought clear, pure, good-tasting water to Baltimore. 222
D. Lake Roland becomes a park for the community
211
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In 1915, as per Freeman’s suggestions, the City discontinued use of the Jones Falls as a
water source. 223 While some parts of the water source blended into the city, the reservoirs took
up large areas of land in both the City and County. 224 The Lake Roland reservoir was left as
green space. 225 The reason behind the city not putting the lake to another use was most likely the
City Beautiful Movement, which had been the backdrop for the decision to build at the
Montebello site. 226 As illustrated by the Montebello Plant, City Beautiful emphasized parks and
recreation as well as beauty in municipal architecture. 227 The decision to leave green space was
likely in the same vein. 228 This makes it less surprising that that in spite of the potential value of
the land as real estate, the City would choose to convert it to a park. 229 From 1915 until 1965, no
one complained about this decision. 230
The land was officially made a park in the 1940’s. 231 It was originally called Robert E.
Lee Memorial Park, but in the recent efforts to remove the names of confederate leadership from
parks and monuments, it became Lake Roland Park. 232 The park was in a state of disarray until a
few years ago. 233 The buildings, which were once associated with the water system, were
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deteriorating and the park grounds were not well maintained. 234 Baltimore City simply did not
have the assets to maintain it as a first class park. 235 So, it leased the park to Baltimore County,
which was able to invest and improve the park dramatically. 236 Today, the park spans over five
hundred acres and includes trails, a dog park, many pavilions, and, of course, the historic Lake
Roland Dam. 237 Visitors can enjoy a plethora of activities from hiking to canoeing to spending a
beautiful day with their canine companions. 238 In the midst of urban and suburban sprawl, the
park plays an important role in the community. 239
V. SHREVE BRINGS HIS CASE
A. C. A. Buchanan Shreve
The City operated its park at Lake Roland in peace until 1965, when C. A. Buchanan
Shreve, one Mr. Charles A Buchanan’s heirs, entered the picture. 240 While much of Mr. Shreve’s
biographical history has been lost in the waste bin of time, his worldview has been preserved in
the archives of The Baltimore Sun. 241 Mr. Shreve had a penchant for writing letters to the
editor. 242 A review of these letters reveals a common theme: 243 Government, even when it acts
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with the best of intentions, should not be trusted with development. 244 In one letter, he expressed
his doubts as to whether a bridge to Assateague Island was an efficient use of taxpayer dollars
because it was impossible to construct buildings there. 245 Today, of course, Assateague is a
popular camping area. 246 In another letter, he railed against a park being built on the Jones Falls
near the Hampden neighborhood in Baltimore City. 247 He explained that the land had
traditionally been used as mill sites. 248 Many parks exist in the Hampden area today and are
enjoyed by City dwellers. 249 In a third letter, he expressed that the City had no business getting
into the business of urban renewal explaining that the city planners were too “visionary” and
“impractical”. 250 Two things are clear from Mr. Shreve’s writings. 251 First, he believed the
government, though acting on good intentions, was incompetent in determining the course of
development in Baltimore and beyond. 252 Second, he believed that land was only useful insofar
as people could develop it for economic gain. 253
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B. Mr. SHREVE’S CLAIM
Shreve and other Buchanan heirs retained the counsel of Arthur Machen Jr. of Venable,
Baetjer, and Howard. 254 On January 28th 1965, they filed a suit in ejectment in the Baltimore
County Circuit Court. 255 The claim laid out the facts as follows. 256 The Mayor and City Council
had taken the Buchanan land for use as part of the City’s water works in 1857. 257 However, the
City had ceased that use and begun using the land as park and recreational area. 258 This was
impermissible under the Enabling Act because the City could only acquire land to convey water.
So, when it ceased using the property at Lake Roland for reservoir purposes, title reverted to
Buchanan’s successors in interest. 259 The complaint went on explain how Mr. Shreve and each of
the other plaintiffs were successors in interest to Mr. Buchanan. 260 Finally, it stated that the
plaintiffs not only sought ejectment of the City, but also one and a half million dollars. 261
Including Mr. Shreve there were seven plaintiffs named in the complaint.262 On February
11th, 1965, two more members of the Buchanan family claiming fractional interests in the
property successfully filed a motion to intervene bringing the grand total of plaintiffs to nine.263
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Given that the complaint was filed one hundred and seven year after the original 1857
inquisition, this large number of heirs claiming fractional interests was unsurprising. 264
C. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
On February 16, 1965, the City Solicitor’s office filed a request for production of
documents demanding: 1) the inquisition proceedings; 2) the written instrument from which the
legal description of the property was taken; 3) Ordinance No. 173; and 4) the instruments
proving the plaintiffs were Mr. Buchanan’s successors in interest. 265 Once, it received these
documents, the City demurred. 266 The Baltimore Sun reported on the arguments made in the
lower court proceeding. 267 Machen, for Shreve, argued that when the Water Board transferred
the property to the Department of Parks and Recreation in 1945, the underlying conditions of the
taking no longer existed. 268 Ambrose T. Hartman 269, for the City, argued that the original
condemnation proceeding showed on its face that the City had taken the property in fee simple
absolute. 270
Judge Proctor of the Baltimore County Circuit Court sustained the demurrer. 271 He
looked at precedent cases and the plain language of the condemnation. 272 First, he found that
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Graff, provided no guidance, as the Maryland Court of Appeals had not considered the quality of
the City’s title. 273 Second, Proctor explained that the Kane decision did not rest on the language
of the statue but on the Maryland Constitution.274 The Kane Court had held that under the
Maryland Constitution, the General Assembly could only confer the power to take for public
uses, and so, the City could only condemn what it needed for the specified public use. 275 This
was the way the Maryland Court of Appeals had interpreted Kane in Taylor. 276 However, the
Proctor wrote, it was necessary to look at further dicta in Taylor, which said that the Enabling
Act gave the City the power to purchase in fee. 277 Proctor further explained that “purchase” in
the first section of the Enabling Act applied both when the City negotiated the sale of property
and when it condemned. 278 Thus, all that remained was to determine what interest the City had
acquired in Buchanan’s land. 279 Looking at the plain language of the condemnation, he saw that
the jury had been instructed to value and did value the fee simple estate. 280 Thus, the land would
not revert to Shreve and his co-plaintiffs. 281 Machen filed a timely appeal. 282
D. IN THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
1. The Arguments
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Hartman and Machen took drastically different approaches to the questions presented. 283
The first issue was whether or not the Enabling Act gave the City power to take in fee simple
absolute. 284 Machen, writing for Shreve, took a historical, contextual approach. 285 Meanwhile
Hartman, writing for the City, stuck to the text of the statute and case law.

286

The second issue

was whether or not the City had in fact taken the Buchanan property in fee simple absolute. 287
Again Hartman’s argument was more heavily textual. 288
Machen looked at the statute within the broader context of Maryland’s eminent domain
history. 289 He first explained that in the United States, unlike in feudal England, eminent domain
principles are based in balancing the power of the sovereign to take property with the
individual’s property rights. 290 He further explained that in 1857 Baltimore City, as a “creature
of the legislature,” only had the eminent domain powers that the General Assembly granted it. 291
The General Assembly had explicitly given Baltimore power to take in fee simple for other
municipal purposes and had not been so explicit in the Enabling Act. 292 Further, the City did not
have a general eminent domain power until 1898 and did not have a power of eminent domain
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without possibility of reverter until 1908. 293 Thus, Machen claimed the City could not have
condemned Buchanan’s property in fee simple. 294
Machen furthered his argument by analyzing at the prior cases in which the Maryland
Court of Appeals had interpreted the Enabling Act. 295 Graff he claimed showed how indecisive
the City was when it set out to condemn property for its water system. 296 Machen claimed the
General Assembly had been worried about such indecision and did not grant the Mayor and City
Council fee simple condemnation powers as a result. 297 Kane, for Machen, was decisive of the
question at bar. 298 Kane clarified that the City could only take property necessary to convey
water. 299 After the City shut down the Jones Falls, the Buchanan property was no longer
necessary to convey water. 300 Finally, he explained that the dicta in Taylor mentioning the City’s
ability to condemn in fee under the Enabling Act should be disregarded. 301 Whether the City
could condemn in fee was not before the Court and the Court was merely speculating. 302 In so
speculating, the Court had disregarded the lack of a reference to fee simple in section two of the
Enabling Act. 303 Machen explained that he interpreted the Enabling Act in two parts. 304 Section
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one gave the City power to purchase by agreement and mentioned fee simple. 305 Conversely,
section two gave the City the power to condemn and failed to mention fee simple. 306 So, it only
gave the City the power to purchase a “use in fee” or fees simple determinable. 307 So,
condemned property like Buchanan’s would revert when the use changed. 308
Turning to the condemnation proceeding itself, Machen argued that despite the references
to the jury valuing both the damages to Buchanan attributable to the condemnation and the fee
simple thereof, the City had nonetheless only acquired a “use in fee” or fee simple
determinable. 309

The same language had been used in the Kane inquisition, which had only

conferred the City with a right of way. 310 As such, Machen argued the cases should be
interpreted consistently and the City could only have attained a right of way or at most a fee
simple determinable. 311
Finally, Machen also took on two equitable considerations. 312 First, he explained, the
plaintiffs were not trying to have their cake and eat it too as Judge Proctor had suggested. 313
They were merely asking if the City had taken the whole cake in the first place. 314 Second, he
argued that that the Court need not worry about a parade of plaintiffs coming in to assert
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reversionary interests. 315 The City had only been able to condemn land without the possibility of
reverter since 1908, and only a few acts pre-1908 had not conferred the power to condemn in fee
simple absolute on the city. 316
Hartman, writing for the City, based his arguments in the text of the condemnation and
Enabling Act using case law as a gloss. 317 First, Hartman took Machen to task on his statutory
interpretation. 318 Because statutes must be interpreted consistently though all their parts, if
section one gave the power to purchase property in fee simple by agreement, then section two
should allow it to condemn the same property in fee simple as well. 319 Hartman suggested that
some language in section two gave rise to this inference. 320 It used the words “to purchase and
hold or use” and also said that the jury should state the interest the City was acquiring in the
condemnation documents. 321
Next, Hartman turned to case law. 322 He explained that in a recently decided case,
Johnson v. State Roads Commission, the Court has interpreted an 1826 act with less broad
language than the Enabling Act as allowing the city to acquire land in fee simple. 323 He further
explained that Johnson had been about tracks for a railroad, which are sometimes thought of as
merely requiring an easement. 324 Meanwhile, this case was about a reservoir, which courts had
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thought of as requiring a fee simple title. 325 Then, he took on the Kane case, which he explained
did not rule out the City condemning land in fee simple, but rather limited it to necessity.326
Furthermore, the Enabling Act did not limit the City to fee simple determinable takings merely
because it had a named public use. 327 The same was true in Johnson. 328 The railroad had been
limited to taking what was necessary for its purposes. 329 And yet, Court had not interpreted that
act preventing the corporation from acquiring in fee simple. 330
The only question that remained was whether the City had actually condemned the
Buchanan land in fee simple. 331 Hartman found that the words “use and occupation,” which
Machen had relied on in proving that the City had acquired a fee simple determinable, were
boilerplate language from section two of the Enabling Act. 332 He also explained that the words
“fee simple” in the condemnation proceeding must mean what they say. 333 In Johnson, words
other than fee simple – absolute estate in perpetuity – were said to convey a fee simple absolute
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estate. 334 Further, he explained that the dollar amount –thirteen thousand dollars for fifty-five
acres – was certainly a fair price. 335 Thus, the City had obtained Buchanan’s land in fee
simple. 336
2. The Decision
The Court of Appeals noted that Machen’s historical arguments were an interesting read,
but decided for the City. 337 The Court identified two key issues: 1) whether the City had the
power to take property in fee simple under the Act; 2) whether it had accomplished a fee simple
taking of Mr. Buchanan’s land.
Considering the first issue, the Court found that the Act enabled the City to acquire
property in fee simple absolute rather merely enabling it to acquire easements or fee simple
determinable estates. 338 The Court explicitly declined Machen’s invitation to delve into the
history of eminent domain and stuck to case law and statutory text. 339 It started by quoting two
relevant parts of the Enabling Act: a) the City could take property “forever or for a term of
years;” and b) the jury could assess the amount the City should pay to “hold or use” the property,
and that the inquisitions should “describe the property to be taken *** and the quantity or
duration of the interest in the same *** and the payment or tender of the damages assessed ‘shall
entitle the City to use, estate and interest in the same as fully as if it had been conveyed by the
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owners”. 340 The Court declined to use Machen’s section-by-section approach and chose to look
at the Enabling Act as whole. 341 Turning to whether takings under the Enabling Act were
limited to mere easements, the Court explained that if the act had only empowered the City to
acquire easements, it would have been more particular in its language. 342 Further, even in 1877
in Taylor, the Enabling Act had been interpreted as allowing the city to acquire a fee. 343 The
Court then turned to whether under the Enabling Act the City could take the property in fee
simple absolute or just fee simple determinable. 344 Shreve insisted that the General Assembly
had only given the power to condemn property as part of its waterworks and that once the use
changed; it had to revert to the prior owners. 345 In assessing the merits of Shreve’s argument, the
Court relied heavily the Johnson case. 346 It found that that the language in the Enabling Act both
mirrored the 1826 statute that had been interpreted in Johnson and was broader than it. 347 As
such, the Enabling Act necessarily empowered the city to take in fee simple. 348 The Court also
rejected the argument that the property had to revert if the City ceased using it as part of the
waterworks. 349 It explained that while the City could not have initially condemned the property
for another use, it could, in good faith, condemn for the permitted use then transition to another
use when circumstances changed. 350
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After finding that the Enabling Act allowed fee simple condemnations, it remained only
to decide whether the inquisition jury had condemned the property in fee simple absolute. 351 The
Court found that it had. 352 The jury instructions and verdict both included the words “fee
simple”. 353 Again, this case was clearer than Johnson in which the jury had used the words
“absolute estate in perpetuity” to mean fee simple. 354 The order also stated that Buchanan and his
heirs were to have continued access to a private road across the property. 355 The Court
rhetorically asked why Buchanan would have to retain a right of way for the road if the city had
obtained a mere easement. 356
Despite the language in the condemnation proceeding, the Court also had to overcome the
Kane, which held that the City could not condemn more than it needed to convey water. 357 The
Court noted that Kane was “unusual” and that the records had unfortunately disappeared. 358 It
went on to explain the facts and holding in Kane. 359 In particular, it focused on a portion of the
opinion that stated:
In our opinion, the decree did not alter or enlarge the rights of the city, acquired under the
condemnation. That [the condemnation] conferred upon the city, in perpetuity, the use
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and occupation of the stream, for the purpose mentioned in the Act, but left Tonge, “all
such use of it as did not injuriously interfere there with”. 360
The Court decided that words in quotation marks were from the original condemnation
proceeding. 361 So, later when the City interplead and was declared fee simple owner, it still could
not own more than it had purchased in the condemnation proceeding. 362 Alternately, the Court
explained that even if the words were not from the condemnation proceeding, Kane would not
control. 363 If the City condemned more than it needed to convey water, there was no public
purpose. 364 In the case of Buchanan’s land, the City had condemned and used the Buchanan
property in good faith for use as a reservoir. 365 Thus, Johnson was more analogous than Kane. 366
The Court also added that if it decided the City could not condemn in fee simple, here, it
could never do so. 367 At some point, any public use may become obsolete. 368 So, under Shreve’s
interpretation, every condemnation would be a fee simple determinable and the possibility of
reverter would forever lurk. 369 The Court found this untenable. 370 The City held the land in fee
simple. 371
VI. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE SHREVE DECISION
360
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a. The fundamental tensions in the case
The Court in the Shreve decision dealt with two fundamental tensions. 372 The first was
one of statutory interpretation. 373 To what extent should the Court let in information outside the
statutory text and the case law in order to determine the meaning of a statute? 374 The second one
tension was a matter of the public use requirement. 375 Exactly how much does “public use”
protect property owners from the caprice of the condemner? 376
1. How far from the four corners of the document and case law should the court go?
The Court made the explicit decision not to look at the history Machen presented in his
briefs. 377 It reasoned that it has to be consistent with Johnson decision. 378 Johnson was
temptingly dispositive of Shreve’s claims 379 and Machen’s historical arguments were somewhat
attenuated. 380
A. Following Johnson disposed of many of the questions in Shreve’s case
The Johnson Court was faced with an analogous situation to the one in Shreve’s case.381
As in Shreve, land had been taken for one public use and because that use became untenable, it
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was converted to another public use. 382 The plaintiffs in Johnson sought a decree regarding the
ownership interests in a parcel in Anne Arundel County. 383 They had purchased the land in
1944. 384 However, Annapolis and Elkridge Railroad Company had condemned the land in
1838 385. Subsequently, the railroad became defunct and sold the property to the State Highway
Commission386. The question presented, as in Shreve, was whether property had been
condemned in fee simple or as a mere easement. 387 Johnson claimed that if it had only
condemned an easement, it would revert to him after the company had ceased to use it in
1935. 388
The Johnson statute also laid out much the same procedure as the Enabling Act. 389 The
act at issue allowed the railroad to acquire everything from land to timber to materials to make
tunnels, warehouses, tracks and stations. 390 Thus, it would need fee simple condemnation
power. 391 Additionally, the act instructed the jury to state the interest that the company would
acquire. 392 In the case of the land at issue, the jury had followed that procedure and condemned
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the land at one hundred and twenty dollars per acre as an “absolute estate in perpetuity.” 393 The
Court found that the words “could only be construed to describe a ‘fee simple’ or as it was some
times called, ‘a fee simple absolute’”. 394 The Court noted that many commentaries define a “fee
simple” as an absolute estate or an estate in perpetuity. 395 The Court said while the words “in
perpetuity alone could connote a lesser interest,” but with absolute estate they certainly connoted
fee simple. 396 This exercise was unnecessary for the Court in Shreve because the jury had
actually used the words fee simple. 397
Maryland Courts have distinguished Johnson twice since it was decided. 398 Of the two
only one, DC Transit Systems Inc. v. State Roads Commission, deals with the interpretation of a
condemnation proceeding. 399 It explicitly distinguishes Johnson because the condemnation
proceeding stated that the interest acquired was “right of way for rail road purposes,” which the
Court found was an easement. 400 When simply looking at the text of the condemnation
proceeding and the purpose of the land, Shreve is actually much clearer than both these cases. 401
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The condemnation proceeding uses the words “fee simple” 402 and the purpose for the land was
reservoir, which put the majority of the condemned land underwater. 403
B. Fact Checking Machen’s history
After looking at Johnson, the Enabling Act, and the condemnation proceeding, the
Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed both Machen’s broad strokes of eminent domain history as
well as his attempts to connect the dots between acts and cases relating to the creation of the
water system. 404 These arguments are flawed, but deserve a closer look.
First, Machen is likely inaccurate in his assessment that the General Assembly was
reluctant to give the City power to condemn in fee simple because it showed signs of
indecision. 405 He argued that in what happened in Graff – the City having a jury value land then
not purchasing it – showed the indecision the General Assembly feared. 406 First of all, hindsight
is 20/20. 407 The General Assembly could not have known the City would take indecisive
actions. 408 In fact, the Enabling Act shows evidence that the City had been decisive when the
General Assembly put pen to paper. 409 Section five of the Enabling Act mentions a dam at
Raven’s Rock showing the City came forward with plans to develop the Gunpowder Falls.410
The ongoing assessments of both potential water sources by engineering experts could be argued
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to show indecision.411 However, they could also be said to show a desire to make an educated
municipal decision. 412 Before the Enabling Act was approved, there is little evidence that the
City was going to be indecisive. 413
Second, Machen’s interpretation Act of 1908 has flaws as well. 414 Machen claimed that a
1908 Act, which stated that property the City condemned would not revert, was an attempt to
overrule Kane and allow the City to acquire land in Fee Simple for reservoirs. 415 Hartman did a
good job of debunking its relation to Kane in his brief. 416 Hartman pointed out that that act was
put in place more than thirty years after Kane was decided and thus, not likely a direct reaction to
the case. 417 Hartman’s explanation is satisfactory. It is worth adding that at the time it was
enacted, the City was focused on developing its water system and perhaps that is why the portion
about reservoirs was specifically included. 418 However, the question remains as to why in that
same 1908 act the city had to add in the non-possibility of reverter for all property. 419 It was
likely just tying up loose ends from the 1898 act that had granted the city general eminent
domain powers, but failed to be specific about possibility of reverter. 420
3. The Public Use Question

411

See supra, Part II.
See supra, Part II.
413
See supra, Part II. Only after when the Know Nothing mayors came to power did the City
start making what appeared to be unsound decisions. See supra, Part II.
414
Brief of the Appellant, supra note 289, at 11 – 12.
415
Brief of the Appellant, supra note 289, at 11 – 12.
416
Brief of the Appellee, supra note 317, at 24.
417
Brief of the Appellee, supra note 317, at 24.
418
See supra, Part III.
419
1908 Md. Laws 214.
420
1898 Md. Laws 54.
41
412

The question in Shreve really comes down to how much the public use prong of Eminent
Domain articles should protect landowners. 421 The Court flatly rejected the proposal that land
taken for a public use can only be used for that public use forever or it will revert explaining that
if it had so held in this case, every property taken would have the possibility of reverter. 422 It is
not alone in so holding. 423 The highest courts of other states when confronted with similar
problems have similarly held. 424
However, there is an argument to be made that property owners should have greater
protections. 425 Municipal decision-making is imperfect and often a product of the political
climate rather than sound judgment. 426 The Know-Nothing mayors’ decision to develop the
Jones Falls over the Gunpowder Falls is illustrative of this point. 427 Engineering experts had told
them the Gunpowder was a cleaner and more profound water source and they were faced with a
growing population. 428 However, they chose the cheaper option. 429 A decision like this speaks
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for itself as to why cities might not be trusted with the power to condemn in fee simple
absolute. 430 Their poor condemnation decisions are lasting ones. 431
On the other hand, the stability of allowing a city to take in fee simple certainly has
appeal as well. 432 The possibility of reverter, especially with use restrictions, may create
disincentive making adequate improvements to failing public works. 433 Sometimes, condemners
take and use land for a public use, but the use become obsolete like the railroad in Johnson. 434 Or
as happened in Shreve, the use had to be discontinued for the health and safety of the public. 435
When the condemner holds that land in fee simple, it may see this as an opportunity for
modernization and improvement. 436 However, where there is a possibility of reverter, the City
will have less incentive to improve because of the potential for suits like Shreve’s. 437 Further
reverter is an exception to the rule against perpetuities; so, successors in interest to the original
owner could come forward centuries later. 438 Condemners have successfully dealt this in two
ways. 439 First, as in Shreve, they have won in court. 440 Second, some condemners have modified
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the rule against perpetuities to keep hold of land that would otherwise revert in order to avoid the
complexity of finding successor in interest and better serve communities. 441 The results have
been beneficial for communities. 442 The railroad in Johnson, for example, became a highway. 443
Many other defunct railroads have become bike trails. 444 And, of course, many enjoy Lake
Roland Park. 445 The unpalatable capriciousness in one case is no reason to punish
condemners. 446
VII. CONCLUSION
Discretion in condemnation proceedings has often led to imperfect results. 447 The ebbs
and flows of politics have a great deal of influence on the process. 448 What starts out as a sound
decision making process can become capricious merely because a different party has taken the
mayoral seat. 449 That is what happened in the case of Baltimore’s water system. 450 The City
started out consulting multiple engineers on the best water source, but then the power balance
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changed. 451 The final decision hinged on the financial situation of the moment rather than on
what would be the most lasting and effective water source for the City. 452 This decision had
lasting effects on Baltimore. 453 In the immediate future, it lead to a public health crisis and
greater cost to the City, which ended up paying to renovate the water system. 454 In the far future,
it led to many wonderful parks along the Jones Falls, including Lake Roland Park. 455 Many city
and county residents have enjoyed this unintended consequence. 456
Shreve’s case brought the questionable aspects of the 1850’s decision into court. 457 While
the appellate opinion is sanitized of any history, it does bring forward the question of whether
failed municipal decision-making should be able to have a lasting mark on a City’s landscape.458
It is important to remember that the possibility of reverter is also lasting as an exception to the
rule against perpetuities. 459 Where this possibility lurks, there may be less incentive to
improve. 460 Finding or identifying successors in interest to bargain with or return the property to
may be impossible centuries later. 461 Where it does not lurk, municipalities have the flexibility to
create new public goods for their citizens and evade the inconvenience of negotiating with
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successors in interest. 462 In many cases where former 18th Century innovations once stood, there
are now urban oases such as parks and trials. 463
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Appendix A: “Watershed Management Program.” Baltimore County Md. Environmental
Protection and Sustainability. Baltimore County, Md., 12 June 2015. Web. 30 Nov. 2015.
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Appendix B: Buchanan Property Condemnation Map
"Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for the Baltimore Water Works, Condemnation of Land
of Charles A. Buchanan." Plat Book WPC. Vol. 6. Baltimore: n.p., 1857. 58. Maryland State
Archives: Plats. Web. 30 Oct. 2015.
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Appendix C:
Ambrose T. Hartman: “Always bridesmaid, never a bride”
Ambrose T. Hartman served twice as Deputy Baltimore City Solicitor and once a
Maryland Assistant Attorney General. 464 Reflecting on his career, he once remarked to Governor
Kurt Schmoke that he was “always a bridesmaid, never a bride". 465 Contrary to what this quote
suggests, Mr. Hartman was somewhat of a legal legend in the Baltimore community. 466 He
successfully argued before the United States Supreme Court and had a hand in many prominent
cases for Baltimore City and the State of Maryland. 467
Hartman was born in 1925 in Baltimore County. 468 He attended Towson Catholic High
School in 1943. 469 He joined the United States Army during World War II and fought in the
European Theatre. 470 He earned the bronze star for his service and a purple heart for being
wounded. 471 When he returned from the war, he attended the University of Maryland at College
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Park and then the University of Maryland School of Law on the GI Bill 472. He graduated in
1951. 473
Hartman was predominantly a public servant throughout his career. Right out of law
school, he worked as an Assistant Attorney General in the Maryland Office of the Attorney
General. 474 In 1952, he served on the team of lawyers who tried the case of G. Edward
Grammer. 475 He successfully argued the Grammar case in the Maryland Court of Appeals and
gained esteem and recognition in Maryland’s legal community. 476
He worked at the Office of the Attorney General until 1955 when he join a private law
firm, but that only lasted until 1959.477 That year, he was asked to join the City Solicitor's
Office. 478 He bounced back into private practice with Miles and Stockbridge in 1961, but
returned to the City Solicitor's office when Republicans returned to office in 1967. 479 He
remained there for the rest of his career. 480
His career included many storied arguments and cases. 481 In 1954, he argued the case of
Salzburg v. Maryland before the United State Supreme Court and won. 482 The case was about
whether or not a Maryland statute disallowing the use of evidence obtained in illegal searches
472
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and seizures in all misdemeanors except some gambling misdemeanors in Anne Arundel County
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 483 More humorously, as a Deputy City Solicitor, he once
argued that “air is free until you sell it” in the Maryland Court of Appeals and won. 484 The
reputation he gained afforded him the opportunity to work on some of the most complex issues
the City Solicitor’s Office had to offer. 485
When he finally retired to South Carolina in 1993, colleagues, rivals and city politicians
were quoted in the Baltimore Sun praising him. 486 Some expressed fear that the city would be in
trouble with his “institutional memory” leaving the office. 487 Mayor Kurt Smoke declared him to
be great role model especially for public servants. 488 Hartman himself simply said that he had
gotten a great deal of enjoyment from public service and that he was happy to be retiring while
still in good health. 489
Hartman died in South Carolina in 2009. 490 Hartman’s life as a City Solicitor had been a
noble one. 491 While a career as a city public servant may not have earned him wealth and world
fame, many appreciated him. 492 It was later said that he had given his life to his career and the
city was better for his service. 493
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